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Abstract: It has been claimed that photographs are transparent: we see
through them; we literally see the photographed object through the photo-
graph. Whether this claim is true depends on the way we conceive of seeing.
There has been a controversy about whether localizing the perceived object in
one’s egocentric space is a necessary feature of seeing, as if it is, then photo-
graphs are unlikely to be transparent. I would like to propose and defend
another, much weaker, necessary condition for seeing: I argue that it is neces-
sary for seeing that there is at least one way for me to move such that if I were
to move this way, my view of the perceived object would change continuously
as I move. Since this condition is not satisfied in the case of seeing objects in
photographs, photographs are not transparent.papq_1380 463..480
I. Seeing in versus seeing through
It has been argued that photographs are transparent: we see through
them.1 Thus, we literally see the photographed object when we are looking
at photographs. We do not see through drawings and paintings: we do not
literally see the depicted object when looking at these.
Why is this view tempting? Photographs have what Grice called ‘natural
meaning’:2 the weird feature that if a photograph is of Oscar Wilde, this
implies that Oscar Wilde existed (and looked thus and so). Photographs
carry information about what they are the photographs of: they could not
exist or they could not be the way they are if what they are of did not exist.3
Seeing a photograph of my partner’s cheating on me counts as evidence
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that she did cheat on me in a way that seeing a sketch of my partner’s
cheating on me would not.4 Further, if the photographed object had been
different (in some relevant ways), the photograph would also have been
different (in the same ways).5 These are very important claims about the
ontology and about the epistemology of photographs.6 But the claim I am
about to examine is not about the ontology or the epistemology of pho-
tographs, but about our experience of photographs. It has been argued
that a straightforward way of explaining why photographs have this
special epistemic status compared to other pictures has to do with the way
in which we experience them: we see through photographs, but not paint-
ings and drawings.7
This contrast is becoming somewhat blurry in the light of the following
considerations. Photographs are pictures. Thus, a general account of
depiction must also apply in the case of photographs. But according to the
general account of depiction that most proponents of photographic trans-
parency endorse, what makes pictures pictures is the experience we are
supposed to go through when looking at them and this experience is that
of seeing-in: we see the depicted object in the picture.8 But seeing the
depicted object in the picture is a way of seeing it. Thus, when I see a
drawing or painting of x, I see x in a certain way (in the drawing or
painting). But then why are these cases different from that of looking at
photographs, where I also see x upon looking at the photograph of x?9
The answer is that while we do not literally see x in a picture, we do
literally see x when we are looking at a photograph of x. Thus, the question
becomes the following: what is the difference between literally seeing and
just seeing (non-literally). The proponents of photographical transparency
say that seeing the photographed object in (or, rather, through) the pho-
tograph is very much like seeing an object through a mirror or binoculars
and not at all like seeing a depicted object in a painting. As Lopes says, ‘to
say that photographs are transparent is to say that we see through them.
[. . .] seeing a lily through a photograph of a lily is like [. . .] seeing a lily in
a mirror, through binoculars, or on a closed-circuit television system’.10
This, in itself, will not do. There are clear differences between seeing an
object through a photograph and seeing an object through a mirror or
through binoculars. Most advocates of the thesis of photographic trans-
parency admit that the former involves something like what Richard
Wollheim called the twofoldness of our experience: we are simultaneously
aware of both the depicted object and the depiction itself.11 Walton claims
that twofoldness is a necessary feature of our experience of all depictions,
including photographs:
Seeing-in is an experience characterized by what [Wollheim] calls ‘twofoldness’: one sees the
marked picture surface, and one sees the subject of the picture. [. . .] I propose that my theory
goes some way towards showing how two different intentional contents can be combined.
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The experience is a perception of the pictorial surface imagined to be a perception of [. . .]
whatever is depicted.12
Lopes, although he has reservations about the concept of twofoldness as a
necessary condition for depiction,13 does appeal to something very much
like twofoldness when cashing out what photographic transparency
means. He writes:
In normal circumstances, seeing through a photograph happens simultaneously with seeing
the photographic surface itself [. . .]. Photographic transparency is not photographic
invisibility.14
Seeing through photographs is a twofold experience, whereas seeing
through a mirror is not: we are not simultaneously aware of the mirror
surface and the object we see through the mirror. The same goes for seeing
through binoculars. Thus, seeing through photographs is quite different
from seeing through binoculars.
But the proponents of the transparency thesis do not need to be com-
mitted to saying the seeing through photograph and seeing something face
to face or through binoculars are of the same kind of perceptual processes.
They only need to argue that they are importantly similar. More precisely,
they argue that seeing through photographs is more similar to seeing
through binoculars than it is to seeing something in a painting. Their main
claim is that seeing something in a photograph and seeing something
through binoculars are both instances of literally seeing, while seeing
something in a painting is not.15 This is the claim I will argue against.
II. Localization in egocentric space
How could one argue against this claim? One obvious way to do so is to
question whether seeing an object through a photograph would count as
literally seeing the object – under our everyday conception of what seeing
is. Gregory Currie and Noël Carroll both argued along these lines: they
claim that the ability to localize the perceived object in one’s egocentric
space is a necessary condition for seeing the object.16 In the light of the
considerations in the last section about seeing objects in paintings, this
claim could be rephrased as a necessary condition for literally seeing – and
not for seeing in general, as this necessary condition does not apply in the
case of seeing things in pictures, which is, as we have seen, also a way of
seeing things. We usually cannot localize objects we see in photographs in
our egocentric space; therefore, we do not literally see objects through
photographs.
Walton counters this argument in the following way.17 Suppose that I
am in the middle of a complex mirror-labyrinth, like the one in the film The
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Lady from Shanghai: everything I see is a reflection of a reflection of a
reflection. Suppose that I set eyes on an apple. Given that I have no idea
how many mirrors are involved in bringing about this impression, I do not
know where this apple is: I cannot localize it in my egocentric space. If I
had to reach for it, I would have no idea how to do that. Thus, Walton
points out, it follows from Currie and Carroll’s necessary conditions for
literally seeing that I do not literally see this apple. But this is clearly
wrong: there is no doubt that we literally see objects through a single
mirror and what happens in this example is just the multiplication of this
case of literal seeing. Even more worryingly, unbeknownst to me, there
may be no mirror between the apple and me. In this case, it would be
difficult to argue that I do not see the apple. Yet, I am unable to localize
it in my egocentric space.
More generally, localizing objects in one’s egocentric space may have
been what object-perception was evolved for, but it does not follow from
this that it is a necessary condition for object-perception. The human
appendix, for example, evolved for decomposing celluloid, but this does
not imply that the ability to decompose celluloid is a necessary feature of
human appendices; in fact at present no human appendices are capable of
decomposing celluloid.
Do these considerations show that localizing an object in one’s egocen-
tric space is not a necessary condition for literally seeing? It is not at all
clear. Gregory Currie, for example, bites the bullet and says that in the
example of the mirror-labyrinth, we do not literally see the apple.18 As the
intuitions about whether localizing the perceived object in one’s egocentric
space is necessary for literally seeing seems to vary, it is unlikely that this
debate could be resolved.
A different, weaker and arguably more plausible way of using egocentric
localization for opposing the transparency claim needs to be mentioned
briefly. Aaron Meskin and Jonathan Cohen argued that the necessary
condition Currie and Carroll set for seeing is too strong because they
interpret egocentric localization to be a doxastic attitude: a matter of
beliefs and knowledge. Meskin and Cohen read Currie and Carroll to set
what they call ‘egocentric spatial beliefs’ as a necessary condition for
seeing.19 Whether or not this interpretation of Carroll and especially of
Currie is correct,20 they propose a weaker necessary condition, according
to which our visual experiences are ‘produced by a process that carries
egocentric spatial information about the [perceived] object’.21 Photographs
do not carry egocentric spatial information: they are ‘spatially agnostic
informants’: hence, we do not see literally see photographed objects. As
Meskin and Cohen say, ‘it is not the case that if the spatial relationship
between the photograph and the [photographed object] were to change
that the image of the [photographed object] would change’.22 And if we
accept this weakened necessary condition for seeing, the mirror labyrinth
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counterexample can be easily explained (the viewer may not have ‘egocen-
tric spatial beliefs’, but her visual experiences are produced by a process
that carries egocentric spatial information about the perceived object.
Meskin and Cohen’s account seems more viable than Carroll’s or Cur-
rie’s, but it is not at all unproblematic.23 My problem with it is that it is still
too strong: it is not satisfied in cases that would be odd not to consider
bona fide instances of seeing. Meskin and Cohen consider the potential
counterexample of optic ataxia patients who are famously bad at localiz-
ing objects in their egocentric space.24 Their response is that although these
patients cannot report the egocentric localization of the objects they see
and they cannot interact with these objects in such a way that would be
based on egocentric information, according to them, this does not show
that the perceptual system of these patients does not carry egocentric
information. This response could be considered to be highly problematic:
if the verbal reports and the bodily movements of these patients do not
justify the claim that their perceptual system carries egocentric informa-
tion, it is difficult to see what could. Meskin and Cohen allude to some
empirical literature on the interaction of the dorsal and the ventral visual
subsystems,25 but it is difficult to see how these experiments are relevant as
they are about a quite special subset of optic ataxia patients (Balint syn-
drome patients) and they do not (or hardly) control for eye movements
(this is not a shortcoming of the experiments, but the way they are used by
Meskin and Cohen). Most optic ataxia patients have problems localizing,
and interacting with, objects that are not in their fovea. It has been known
that they can be fairly good at localizing objects that are in their fovea.26
The worrying version of the optic ataxia objection would concern patients
who can see an object in their fovea but are unable to localize it in their
egocentric space. The Robertson experiments do not have any implica-
tions for this scenario.
But there are even more immediate empirical problems for Meskin and
Cohen’s account. They could dismiss the optic ataxia counterexample as
irrelevant or as something that only concerns a malfunctioning perceptual
system.27 But the problem is that the necessary condition they propose is
not even satisfied by some perceptual episodes of healthy adult humans.
We are very bad at distance perception if the perceived object is a single
point of light. If we have to estimate the distance (or perform some action
that would require the representation of the distance) between a single
point of light and ourselves in a dark room, we invariably represent this
distance as about 60 cm.28 In other words, our perceptual state does not
carry egocentric information about the perceived object: the counterfac-
tual that Meskin and Cohen take to be a necessary condition for seeing is
not satisfied: if the perceived object were to be closer, our perceptual state
would not be different. Yet, presumably, we do not want to say that we do
not see the point of light in these scenarios.
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I need to emphasize that I do not intend these to be knock-down
objections to Meskin and Cohen’s (or Carroll’s and Currie’s) attempt to
argue against the transparency of photographs with the help of focusing on
egocentric localization. But these objections do highlight that neither
version of the egocentric localization account is unproblematic. Instead of
pushing the egocentric localization line further, I would like to consider
another, even weaker, necessary condition for literally seeing, one that may
be less controversial.
III. Sensorimotor contingencies
I will borrow some important observations from the works of C. I. Lewis
and Alva Noë, without taking sides with them on their theory of percep-
tion in general.29 Their proposal is that sensory stimulation is not sufficient
for being in a perceptual state. In order to be able to be in a perceptual
state (and not just sense the proximal stimulus), we must be able to have
the appropriate ‘sensorimotor contingencies’: the way we move around the
perceived object must influence the way the perceived object appears to us.
The basic motivation behind this way of thinking about perception is
that perception is an active process: when we perceive, we are actively
exploring the world: we move our eyes, our head, lean forward, squint, cup
our ears, etc. And as we move, our view of the object changes according to
familiar patterns: if I move closer to my computer, the computer will take
up a larger portion of my visual field. If I move away, it will take up a
smaller portion thereof, etc.
There are various versions of this general suggestion.30 I will mention
four, limiting my attention to the visual sense modality that is the most
relevant in the present context.31 According to one, (i), it is our expecta-
tions about the way our view of the object would change if we moved that
is necessary for seeing it. According to another, (ii), what is necessary for
seeing is that our view of the object would in fact change if we moved, in
the way we anticipated it. A third version, (iii), is that it is just the coun-
terfactual dependence that counts, our expectations or anticipations are
irrelevant: the necessary condition is that our view of the object would
change if we moved. Finally, (iv), maybe it is not a counterfactual, but a
tensed indicative conditional that constitutes a necessary condition for
seeing: if I do move, the way the object appears to me will change.
I certainly do not want to adjudicate between these versions here, nor do
I want to endorse any of them. I will argue for a much weaker claim than
any of these: what is necessary for seeing is that there is at least one way for
me to move such that if I were to move this way, my view of the perceived
object would change continuously as I move.
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It is important to contrast this counterfactual claim with (iii), which also
posits a counterfactual as a necessary condition for seeing: if I see an
object, then it must be true that my view of the perceived object would
change if I moved. According to (iii), any movement of mine would result
in a change in my view of the perceived object. This claim sounds con-
vincing as a necessary condition for many objects that are in our vicinity:
if I moved a step closer to the armchair in my room, my view of it would
change: it would take up a larger part of my visual field. When it comes to
objects that are far away from us, like stars, this condition sounds some-
what less convincing: my view of the Morning Star is pretty much the same
regardless of how wildly I jump about. Similarly, if I moved around a
monochromatic perfect sphere, my view of it would not change either.
But note that if I were to move much closer to the Morning Star, my
view of the latter would indeed change (in pretty much the same way as my
view of the armchair would change). The same is true of the monochro-
matic perfect sphere. Thus, we can give a necessary condition for seeing
that is more plausible than (iii) if we use an existential and not a universal
quantification: if I moved in a certain way, my view of the perceived object
would change (continuously as I move).
In other words, the necessary condition I propose is much weaker than
(iii). My claim is that if I see an object, then it must be true that there is at
least one way for me to move such that if I were to move that way, my view
of the perceived object would change continuously as I move. Thus, it is
not required that for every possible movement I can perform, it is true that
if I were to move that way, my view of the perceived object would change
continuously as I move. All that is required is that there is at least one
possible movement for which this is true.32
Importantly, the necessary condition I propose is that if I were to move
in a certain way, my view of the perceived object would change continu-
ously as I move. Why do we need this last phrase? We need it because
without it, the condition would be vacuous, as pretty much anything
would satisfy it. Suppose that I have a hallucination of my mother’s face.
If I were to travel thousands of miles, my view of my mother’s face would
change: I would see her face to face. But of course having a hallucination
of my mother’s face is the paradigmatic example of a process that does not
count as seeing.33
What makes genuine perception special, and different from hallucina-
tion, is that if I were to move (in a certain specific way), my view of the
perceived object would change continuously. But what does it mean for
my view of an object to change continuously? What it means is that my
view of it changes while I keep my eyes on it. Small changes in my vantage
point would bring about small changes in my view of the perceived object.
This (almost trivial) restriction on the counterfactual rules out cases like
the hallucination of my mother’s face. And those cases that motivated the
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sensorimotor accounts would still satisfy this necessary condition for
seeing.
I used two concepts in my definition that could be thought to be slightly
ambiguous: those of ‘one’s view of something’ and of ‘perceived object’.
First, I do not want to and I do not need to take sides in the Byzantine
debate around what the object of our perception is.34 My argument is
consistent with any notion of the object of perception as long as it is taken
to be a distal mind-independent entity. Second, by ‘one’s view of the
perceived object’, I mean the way the perceived object appears to the
perceiver: Again, depending on one’s theory of perception, there are many
ways of cashing out what ‘the way x appears to A’ means, but I do not
want to take sides in this question either.
Why should we accept my proposed necessary condition for seeing?
Suppose that this condition is not satisfied. Suppose, in other words, that
no matter how wildly I move about around an object, the way it appears
to me would just remain the same. My claim is that it is difficult to see how
this can be an instance of seeing a distal mind-independent object. There
are some objects that look the same from a number of spatial positions. A
monochromatic perfect sphere, for example, would look the same if I were
to look at it from the opposite side. But if I were to move closer to the
perceived object, my view of it would indeed change, even if the perceived
object is very far or it is very small. If I were to move closer to any distal,
extended, mind-independent object, it would look bigger. If it would not
look bigger, no matter how close I am looking at it, it is difficult to see how
it could be a distal, extended, mind-independent object.
It does happen that our sensory stimulation remains the same regardless
of how we move. This is exactly what happens when we see afterimages: no
matter how we moved, the way they appear to us would not change. But
seeing afterimages is one of the stereotypical examples for having sensory
stimulation without perceiving anything. Afterimages are not distal mind-
independent object: we do not perceive them. When we do perceive distal
mind-independent objects it is true that there are ways for us to move such
that if we were to move that way, these distal mind-independent objects
would look different.
It is important to emphasize that the necessary condition I am proposing
is a counterfactual: there is at least one possible movement such that if I
were to move that way, my view of the perceived object would change.
Sometimes we do not or even cannot move that way in the actual world –
maybe the perceived object is just too far away, as in the case of seeing the
Morning Star. But what is supposed to be the necessary condition for
seeing is not a claim about the actual world, but about possible worlds.
Thus, if I were to move that way, my view of the perceived object would
change. According to a widespread account of counterfactuals,35 if the
closest possible world where I move this way and where my view of the
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perceived object changes is closer to the actual world than the closest
possible world where I move this way and where my view of the perceived
object is still the same, then the counterfactual is true.
An important note on the scope of my necessary condition for visual
perception. Of course it is metaphysically possible that it is true of some
perceiver that regardless of how she moves, her view of the perceived
object would be the same. But the question I am concerned with here is not
about some metaphysically possible perceiver, but perceivers like us. The
question about photographic transparency is not a question about meta-
physically possible perceivers in general, but about human (and maybe
non-human animal) perceivers. And in the case of perceivers of this kind,
if they were to look at the perceived object from a closer vantage point,
their view of the object would change.
Finally, it is worth comparing my proposed necessary condition with the
one Meskin and Cohen champion, especially as both accounts make use of
counterfactuals. The first thing to note is that the necessary condition
Meskin and Cohen propose is much stronger than mine: it is in fact
somewhat similar to (iii). As a result, my account is not susceptible to the
two objections I raised against their proposed necessary condition. The
optic ataxia patients see the object in front of them because there is a way for
them to move such that if they were to move that way, their view of the
object would change. In fact, there are many such movements. And when
we are looking at the point of light in the dark room, there are ways for us
to move such that if we were to move that way, our view of the object would
change: we could, for example, move real close to it. As my necessary
condition is much weaker than Meskin and Cohen’s, it is less problematic.
I will argue in Section V that nonetheless it is strong enough to rule out
seeing through photographs.
IV. Objections
I need to consider possible objections that might jeopardize my proposal.
First, suppose that there is a lamp screen fixed to my head. No matter how
wildly I moved, my view of this object would still be the same as the lamp
screen would still be on my head. Do we need to conclude that I do not see
this object? No, we don’t. Again, the necessary condition I have proposed
is a counterfactual. If I were to look at the lamp screen from above, my
view of it would change significantly.
Second, what if I can’t move? Would I not see anything? Note, again,
that the suggested necessary condition is a counterfactual; hence, we have
to consider how my view of the object would change if I did move. And
even if I am paralyzed and looking at an apple, it can be true that if I were
to move, my view of it would change.36
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It is worth mentioning a couple of cases that could be thought of as
obvious prima facie counter-examples against the suggestion that we do
not see an object if regardless of how we were to move, our view of the
object would still be the same.
Do we see stars? Their appearance does not seem to change as we move
around. Note, however, that if it were the case that we looked at the star
from a spaceship that is about to land on it, our view of it would be
significantly different. It is unlikely that this will happen to any of us, but
if it were to happen, our view of the star would be different. The same
argument applies in the case of distant objects in general.37
An interesting special case of seeing stars is seeing a star that has ceased
to exist millions of years ago, as in this scenario the perceived object does
not seem to exist. The necessary condition I am proposing does not rule
out that we can see stars that have ceased to exist. There is a vantage point
(somewhat closer to the star), from where right now we would see the star
as it collapses and becomes a black hole. If I were to look at the star from
this vantage point, my view of it would indeed be different.
Thus, if an agent sees an object, then besides having a certain sensory
stimulation, it also needs to be true that there is at least one way for her to
move such that if she were to move that way, her view of the perceived
object would change continuously. Note that this necessary condition does
not rule out that we do genuinely see the apple in the complex mirror
labyrinth: there are many ways for us to move in the mirror labyrinth such
that if we were to move that way, our view of the apple would change
continuously. There may be some other necessary conditions on genuine
seeing that would militate against the claim that we do genuinely see the
apple in this scenario, but nothing I argued for here would commit us to
take sides either way.
Finally, it is important that I proposed a necessary and not a sufficient
condition for seeing. Stating a sufficient condition for seeing is a notori-
ously difficult task38 and I am not certain that the appeal to sensorimotor
contingencies will help. All I argued for was a necessary condition for
seeing an object. As there are other necessary conditions for seeing, failing
to satisfy the necessary condition I proposed is only one possible reason
why a process can fail to count as seeing. If I see a hologram of an object,
I may not literally see this depicted object, in spite of the fact that the
necessary condition this paper is about may be satisfied.
V. Sensorimotor contingencies and photographs
If it is indeed a necessary condition for seeing that there must be a way for
the perceiver to move such that if she were to move that way, her view of
it would be change continuously as she moves, then we do not see objects
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through photographs. When I am looking at a photograph of an apple, it
is not true that if I were to move around, my view of the apple would be
different. If I were to move around, my view of the photograph itself would
indeed be different, but not that of the photographed object. The same
point is true of pictures in general: if I were to look at a picture from
elsewhere, my view of the depicted object would not change (although my
view of the picture itself would and does change.39
Regardless of how wildly I move around in front of the photograph, it
is not possible to see the photographed object from a different angle. I can
of course see the photograph from a different angle, even from an angle
from which I cannot see anything in it, but as long as I see the photo-
graphed object in the picture, I will see it from the very same angle. If one
looked at the photograph from a different vantage point, the objects in the
photograph would still look the same.
One may raise the following objection. As all that is required for the
necessary condition to be satisfied is that we find one possible way for the
perceiver to move such that if she moved that way, her view of the photo-
graphed object would change continuously as she moves. But then one
may wonder whether this weak condition could still be satisfied by seeing
things in photographs. Suppose that I am looking at a photograph of the
Eiffel Tower. One may admit that if I were to move around in front of the
photograph, my view of the Eiffel Tower would still be the same. But if I
were to fly to Paris and looked at the Eiffel Tower from Palais de Chaillot,
my view of it would indeed be different. So maybe seeing things in pho-
tographs does satisfy the necessary condition I have been proposing.
My response is that the necessary condition is not satisfied. Remember
that the necessary condition I proposed was that there is a way for the
perceiver to move such that if she were to move that way, her view of it
would be change continuously as she moves. This last phrase was added in
order to prevent this necessary condition to be vacuously true. What it
means is that the perceiver’s view changes while she keeps her eyes on the
perceived object. Small changes in the perceiver’s vantage point would
bring about small changes in her view of the perceived object. And this is
clearly not true in the case of travelling to Paris to look at the Eiffel Tower
from a different angle: my view of the Eiffel Tower would not change
continuously. Even if I were to bring the photograph with me and look at
it on the plane and in the cab to Palais de Chaillot, when I look up from
the photograph, my view of it would not change continuously at all. In
fact, in order to look up from the photograph and see the Eiffel Tower
from Palais de Chaillot, I would need to take my eyes off the Eiffel Tower
as depicted in the photograph. This transition is not continuous at all.
Take the following, somewhat similar case that could be thought to be
problematic for my account for similar reasons. Suppose that I am at an
exhibition where dozens of photographs of the Eiffel Tower are exhibited
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in a large room. They are all taken from different angles. Isn’t the neces-
sary condition I am proposing satisfied in this scenario? One could be
tempted to say that it is: if I were to move my head to look at another
photograph, I would see the Eiffel Tower from a different angle: my view
of it would change. In fact, the right answer is that it isn’t. No matter how
I moved my head in that room, my view of the Eiffel Tower would not
change continuously as I moved. It would change all right, but it would
not change continuously; thus, my necessary condition is not satisfied. It is
not the case that I keep my eyes on the Eiffel Tower as my view of it
changes. I have to take my eyes off the Eiffel Tower as depicted in the first
photograph in order to look at the Eiffel Tower as depicted (from a
different angle) in the second photograph. The way my view changes is not
at all continuous.
One may worry that the only purpose this addition of continuous
change to my necessary condition serves is to rule out counterexamples of
this kind. I disagree. We have seen that without this addition of continu-
ous change, the necessary condition for seeing would be satisfied by hal-
lucination. And in those cases that motivated the main idea of
sensorimotor contingencies, the general idea that the way we move around
the perceived object must influence the way the perceived object appears to
us, this necessary condition is satisfied: as we move around an object, our
view of it changes continuously.
Another important objection to my argument is the following.40 The
necessary condition I argued for above does rule out that we see through
photographs. But suppose that at some point we can make three-
dimensional photographs: we can make a three-dimensional replica of,
say, Barack Obama giving his acceptance speech – a photographic equiva-
lent of the wax figures at Madame Tussauds. Would we see through these
three-dimensional photographs?
The necessary condition I discuss above does not rule out these cases:
when we are looking at this three-dimensional photograph, there is a way
for us to move such that if we were to move that way, our view of the
photographed scene would change: if I were to look at the three-
dimensional photograph from the opposite side, I would see the other
profile of the photographed person. Further, my view of it would even
change continuously: if I were to move just a bit to the left, my view
would change just a bit, while I would keep my eyes on the photographed
object. Of course my proposed condition is supposed to be a necessary
and not a sufficient condition – there may be some other necessary
condition that is not satisfied in the case of seeing three-dimensional
photographs. But the fact that my necessary condition is satisfied by
three-dimensional photographs while not satisfied by two dimensional
ones may suggest that this necessary condition is slightly ad hoc in the
sense that it does not say anything important about the perception of
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photographs in general (as it is designed to rule out seeing through two
dimensional photographs).
This is an important observation and it highlights that there are many
perceptual episodes that satisfy this necessary condition and that we may
nonetheless not want to take to be instances of genuine perception. Take
the perception of figurative sculptures, for example. When I am looking at
the Venus of Milo, do I see the Goddess represented by the sculpture?
Probably not (at least if we accept that we cannot see fictional characters),
but the necessary condition I have been arguing for is still satisfied: there
is a way for me to move such that if I were to move that way, my view of
the Venus of Milo would change continuously. The necessary condition
for seeing does not rule out that we literally see what is represented by
sculptures.
This highlights how weak my necessary condition really is. My strategy
was to find a very weak necessary condition for seeing that is nevertheless
not satisfied by seeing the photographed object. There are, of course, lots
of necessary conditions for seeing an object, some more interesting than
others. I do not take the one I have proposed above to be particularly
interesting – it is only interesting in as much as while all examples of seeing
satisfies it, seeing photographed objects does not.
We may be able to give a stronger necessary condition that would not be
satisfied by seeing objects represented by sculptures and three-dimensional
photographs.41 This may be a more interesting necessary condition than
the one I have proposed above, as it may be closer to a necessary and
sufficient condition. But the aim of this paper is not to give a necessary and
sufficient condition for seeing. It is not even to give a particularly inter-
esting necessary condition for seeing. The aim of the paper was to give a
very weak necessary condition that is nonetheless not satisfied by seeing
through photographs.
VI. Conclusion
In Jean-Luc Godard’s film Les Carabiniers there is a scene that could serve
as an example for demonstrating the gist of my argument. A soldier enters
the cinema for the first time in his life. We see an almost naked woman
preparing to take a bath on the screen. She walks out of the frame to the
left. The soldier does not want to lose sight of her, so he walks through the
seats towards the right side of the cinema – as if the screen were a window.
The woman comes back and sinks into the bathtub; the soldier climbs on
his seat to peep into the bathtub, and so on.
What is funny about the sketch is that the soldier seems to think that the
way he moves influences how the woman would look: he assumes that the
same ‘sensorimotor contingencies’ are in place with regards to seeing
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objects on the screen as with regards to everyday seeing. He seems to have
expectations that if his spatial position were different, the woman on the
screen would look different to him. What makes Godard’s scene funny is
that we all know that the soldier is wrong. The ‘sensorimotor contingen-
cies’ that are necessary for our everyday seeing are missing from seeing
things on film.
I argued that it is a necessary condition for literally seeing that there is
at least one way for the perceiver to move such that if she were to move
that way, her view of the perceived object would change continuously. In
the case of seeing through photographs, this necessary condition is not
satisfied: the way the perceived object looks would be the same no matter
where one looked at it from. Therefore, seeing through photographs is not
literally seeing: photographs are not transparent.
We have seen that photographs have a special ontological (and
epistemic) status among pictures. Photographs carry information about
what they are the photographs of: they could not exist or they could not be
the way they are if what they are of did not exist. As we have seen, seeing
a photograph of my partner’s cheating on me counts as evidence that she
did cheat on me in a way that seeing a sketch of my partner’s cheating on
me would not. Note, however, that nothing follows from these claims with
regards to the nature of our experience of photographs. Ontology and
phenomenology are two very different things and the former does not
(necessarily) determine the latter.
Thus, the ontological (and epistemic) considerations about photographs
do not imply that we see through photographs in the same sense as we see
through binoculars. I intended to point out that there is a very important
difference between seeing through photographs and seeing through bin-
oculars: the latter requires that there is a way for the perceiver to move
such that if she were to move that way, her view of the perceived object
would change continuously, whereas the former does not. Seeing through
photographs is in this sense more similar to seeing something in a painting:
in neither case is the necessary condition I proposed satisfied. Thus,
although there may be very important differences between the ontology
(and epistemology) of photographs and paintings, our experiences of them
are very similar: both are ‘seeing in’.42
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